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Abstract:   This paper analyzes the optimal conglomeration of bank activities. We show that
incentive problems in banking sometimes dictate integration of activities, but with perfect
market discipline always push us away from integration/conglomeration. Ineffective market
discipline could make conglomeration optimal, even if conglomeration further undermines
market discipline. We also show that an internal allocation of the cost of capital could add
effective `internal' discipline and improve on the outcome of conglomeration. The analysis
is subsequently applied to the Barings debacle.MARKET DISCIPLINE IN CONGLOMERATE BANKS: IS AN INTERNAL
ALLOCATION OF COST OF CAPITAL NECESSARY AS INCENTIVE DEVICE?
I. INTRODUCTION
Should banks diversify their activities? Although few would readily deny that some
diversification is necessary, banks seem to engage in a broad variety of activities. The question
that arises is what is the optimal conglomeration of bank activities?
In this paper we focus on internal incentive problems that may arise from interactions
between different divisions in a conglomerate bank. A drawback of combining bank activities is
less transparency and therefore a reduction in the effectiveness of market discipline. Due to an
increase in opaqueness of the bank’s balance sheet outsiders cannot assess the performance of
banks sufficiently, and more importantly, have little control over the bank, whereas bank
managers may have excessive discretion. The absence of market discipline may result in free-rider
problems, since each division does not fully internalize the consequences of its own actions.
The primary mechanism that we see for market discipline is its effect on the bank’s cost of
capital. Divisions should face a cost of capital reflecting the riskiness of their activities.
Conglomeration however obscures this process and invites cross-subsidization and free-riding. As
a consequence, market discipline might become ineffective.
A recent example of free-riding (and cross-subsidization) was the Barings debâcle, where
the costs of not inducing market discipline on the proprietary trading department turned out to be
almost prohibitive. Some interpret this debâcle as a meltdown caused by a clash of cultures
between proprietary trading activities and traditional banking, and suggest better internal controls
and external supervision as remedies. In this paper we argue that while internal controls and
supervision may indeed control incentives, they do however not align incentives, but merely
‘brute force’ desired behavior. In the Barings case market discipline was absent. Barings’
corporate banking activities in the UK were effectively underwriting the risky proprietary trading
activities in Singapore. Barings Singapore therefore faced an artificially low cost of capital and
could free-ride on Barings UK.
These internal incentive problems have implications for the optimal organizational
structure and scope of a bank’s activities. While the internal incentives that we have discussed so
far emphasize the cost of conglomeration, some distinct benefits exist as well. One argument in
favor is that separate (market) financing of different activities may suffer from informational
problems and adverse selection premiums elevating funding costs. Combining different divisions
within a bank may lead to diversification benefits in funding (’washing out’ of information
1asymmetries); i.e. neutralizing information asymmetries by diversification may reduce a bank’s
funding costs. Thus diversification could reduce adverse selection (lemon’s) premiums in the
funding costs 
1. Another argument relates to the potentially distortive effects of limited liability.
As is well known, limited liability of shareholders may invite risk taking behavior (Jensen and
Meckling [1976]). Diversification through (implicit)
analysis primarily incorporates the latter effect.
We will emphasize that explicitly considering
co-insurance reduces these incentives. Our
internal incentive problems and the potential
mitigating effects of co-insurance
bank’s activities, and its optimal
market discipline for stand-alone
benefits of conglomeration. We
conglomeration. In the extreme,
have implications for the optimal organizational structure of a
size. Our main insights are as follows. The effectiveness of
activities (divisions) is of crucial importance for the potential
find that effective market discipline pushes us away from
with perfect or complete market discipline of stand-alone
activities conglomeration (in absence of synergies) is never optimal. However, with ineffective
market discipline conglomeration may or may not be beneficial. Since conglomeration further
reduces market discipline, it is surprising that conglomeration might be beneficial; the
diversification  benefits of conglomeration (co-insurance) sometimes dominate the negative
incentive effects. We also show that introducing internal cost of allocation schemes may create
‘internal’ market discipline that complements the weak external market discipline of the
conglomerate. We will emphasize in this context that these schemes should be dynamic and thus
should respond to actual risk choices.
The applicability of our analysis reaches further than the special case of Barings or multi-
divisional banking in general. The analysis transcends to a long-standing issue in industrial
economics concerning the determinants of the boundaries of firms, as discussed in for example
Grossman and Hart [1986], Hart and Moore [1990], Hart [1995] and Holmström and Tirole
[1991]. This literature focuses -as we do- on the benefits and costs of integration and has
implications for the optimal size of multi-divisional firms. Our paper contributes to this literature
by explicitly trading off the costs and benefits of conglomeration in the absence of
complementarily or joint production. We also provide a possible link between the type of a firm’s
assets and the firm’s optimal scope and organizational structure. A related paper in this respect is
Bagwell and Fulghieri [1995], which finds conditions under which synergetic merging may
improve divisional incentives and reduce the costs of internal agency. Furthermore our paper
touches upon the issue of authority and delegation in organizations (see Aghion and Tirole [1994])
1 Gorton and Pennacchi [1990] rationalize security design (in particular the creation of deposits) on these
grounds.
2but then in the context of a multi-divisional firm.
Our analysis of cost of capital allocation schemes is related to recent studies that analyze
the allocation of internally and externally raised capital to investment projects within a firm in the
presence of information and incentive problems (see Harris and Raviv [1995] and Gertner,
Scharfstein and Stein [1994]). Whereas the availability of funds is the central focus of these
papers, we emphasize the benefits of a mechanism for an internal allocation of cost of capital. We
will expand on this in some detail (see Section VI). The point we make is that internal cost of
capital allocations are of imminent importance in banking. Focusing on the allocation of capital
and not on the cost  of capital may induce distortions, and could actually explain why banks
consider capital (prohibitively) expensive.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section II the general framework and
intuition of our model is described. Section III introduces the model, and contains the analysis.
Here we derive the costs and benefits of conglomeration. The internal capital allocation
mechanism is introduced in Section IV. In Section V we link our insights to the Barings debacle
and focus on the interactions between relationship banking and proprietary trading activities.
Section VI adds some further perspective by linking our analysis to the overall cost of capital in
banking. Section VII contains the conclusions. All the proofs are in the Appendix.
II. GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND INTUITION
We present a model in which external financing is potentially subjected to ‘effective’
market discipline. Market discipline is induced by introducing a direct link between (partially
observable) risk choices and funding costs. The interest rate ( = funding cost) set by the market
therefore does not only  anticipate  potentially more risky choices after contracting (the classic
moral hazard), but does also partially  respond  directly to risk choices
z. This implies that a firm
cannot costlessly increase risk ex post. It would then immediately face an extra high interest rate.
This ‘market discipline’ response makes a firm reluctant to increase risk.
The approach taken in this paper is therefore more dynamic than the standard moral
hazard approach. In the standard -static- moral hazard approach unobservable actions (e.g. risk
and effort choices) are made after contract terms have been set. In that case the market will only
2 This formulation strikes a balance between the bad Nash outcome of classic moral hazard (i.e. the
financier anticipates the borrower to deviate from first best -e.g. assume more risk- following the financier’s
announced fixed interest rate) and a full direct internalization of risky decisions by borrowers. Only the
latter provides an effective deterrent. Alternatively, we could have modelled the bank’s debt maturity
structure. With short-term debt and (partially) irreversible risk choices, the bank’s risk choice would
directly affect the (future) funding cost (see Flannery [1994]).
3anticipate the higher (than first best) risk choice and adjust contract terms accordingly. This
however does not constrain moral hazard; to the contrary, moral hazard then becomes even more
severe (i.e. the firm then faces even higher interest rates and will make even more sub-optimal
risk choices). Unless the firm can somehow try to commit to safer choices to prevent these
adverse contract terms, we seem always driven to the worst situation. Therefore we have
introduced effective market discipline by having the interest rate charged to the firm reflect both
(partially observable) actual and anticipated risk choices. Since the firm now bears some of the
additional costs from suboptimal risk taking it may be discouraged to do so.
A second feature of our model is the free-riding due to a ‘moral hazard in teams’ effect
(Holmström [1982]). This is introduced by incorporating separate divisions in a multi-divisional
bank. In this case diversification benefits (in funding costs) may be realized since the separate
divisions actually co-insure each other. However, in the absence of an internal cost of capital
allocation the funding cost of each division only partially reflects the risk choices made by that
division. That is, the consequences of each division’s decisions are shared by all, since the market
only assesses the overall riskiness of the bank. As a consequence divisions can increase risks
without being fully charged for the costs, even if external market discipline is perfect. Thus even
for an arbitrarily high degree of market discipline divisions may choose to free-ride on the bank at
large.
The intuition developed in the paper is as follows. We consider two divisions, A and B,
that need to be financed externally and may either operate as stand-alone firms or may be
integrated in a two-divisional bank. Division A makes a (partially observable and/or verifiable)
risk choice whereas in division B no incentive problems are present. If operated as a stand-alone
firm, division A faces market discipline that counters adverse risk taking incentives; the market
charges an interest rate reflecting actual risk choices. The degree of market discipline imposed
determines the sensitivity of division A’s funding costs with respect to its risk taking behavior.
Higher levels of market discipline mitigate division A’s incentive problems and drive its risk
choices toward first best.
If the two divisions are integrated in one bank, the pooled funding cost reflects only
partially the risk choices of each division; both divisions ‘share’ the consequences of their choices.
Simultaneously the divisions co-insure each other, i.e. the multi-divisional bank’s returns are more
predictable and ceteris paribus default is less likely. This has three consequences. First, the co-
insurance lowers the pooled funding rate, and hence reduces risk-taking incentives induced by
limited liability. We label this the diversification effect of co-insurance.  This effect alone will
improve division A’s risk choices. Second, the default probability of the bank becomes partially
4immune to (excessive) risk taking by division A. This reduces the expected costs of financial
distress, thus inducing risk taking (negative incentive-effect of co-insurance). Third, since the
sensitivity of the pooled funding rate with respect to division A’s risk choice is lower than with
separate financing, market discipline becomes less effective. Division A now only partially
internalizes the higher funding costs associated
become less effective inducing extra inefficiencies
incentive effect of reduced market discipline).
with risk taking. Thus market discipline has
(free-riding) in division A’s decisions (negative
These considerations highlight that -even ignoring the internal allocation of cost of capital-
the diversification benefits might be such that conglomeration is optimal. Diversification ceteris
paribus reduces (nominal) funding rates and as such improves incentives. Note however that in the
case of ‘complete’ or perfect market discipline of stand-alone activities the adverse incentives
associated with limited liability are fully mitigated. In that case diversification has no value and
the negative incentive effects of conglomeration always dominate. Our analysis therefore points at
the importance of market discipline. The general result is that perfect market discipline of stand-
alone activities pushes us away from conglomeration, and imperfect market discipline could make
conglomeration optimal. The latter result holds notwithstanding that conglomeration will always
further reduce market discipline. Surprisingly therefore our analysis shows that conglomeration
might have benefits that ‘replace’ ineffective market discipline even in the absence of internal cost
of capital allocations or other internal control mechanisms. Alternatively, however,
conglomeration might make matters worse. Only when the diversification effect is strong enough
could conglomeration improve on the operations of stand-alone divisions. The benefits of
conglomeration could be improved further by introducing an internal scheme for the allocation of
costs of capital. This mechanism could be designed such that it complements the (external) market
discipline. It enhances the sensitivity of the funding costs of each division, such that free-rider
problems are mitigated.
III. THE BASIC MODEL; SETUP AND ANALYSIS
A. Specification
A. 1 Production Possibilities for Divisions/Firms
The model is a one-period model with universal risk neutrality. The riskless interest rate is
assumed to be zero. Consider two divisions, division A and division B. Each needs to raise $1 for
its investment opportunities. All funding is raised through debt contracts. At t= 0 the manager of
division A decides on the
only partially observable
monitoring intensity m that affects the
and verifiable). A higher monitoring
5
risk of the project
level corresponds
(this choice is
to lower risktaking behavior. The monitoring cost equals V(m), with V'(m)>0 and V"(m)>0. A level of
(t=1) project return of division A has a probability distribution with a two-point support,
generating X>1 in case of success and 0 in case of failure. The manager behaves in the interest
of shareholders. Moral hazard (monitoring aversion) occurs in case of (partial) debt financing.
The future opportunities of division A are aggregated in the parameter F. F represents the
capitalized future profits of division A, incorporating all expected cash flows from the periods
beyond t=1
4. In case of default division A is assumed to terminate and F will be lost. Note that
this F introduces benefits of co-insurance in our analysis.
and O with a probability ( l-pB). The correlation between the project returns (or, more precisely,
A.2 Organizational Structure
We distinguish two organizational structures:
(1) Both division A and division B operate separately and independently (stand-alone option).
Each is funded directly in competitive credit markets. The funding costs of division A and
B are RA and RB respectively.
(2) Division A and division B are integrated in one firm. The funding costs of the two-
divisional firm then are given by R0.
We assume that the two-divisional firm will only default if the projects of both divisions fail. This
incorporates co-insurance in the model
6.
The sequence of events in the game is as follows. At t=0 the organizational structure of
the firm is determined and the divisions’ activities are funded. Then both divisions invest their $1.
The manager of division A chooses the monitoring intensity (thus the level of risk). At t= 1 cash
This will be discussed in more detail in Section VI.
4 The level of F could be assumed to depend on the degree of ‘competition’ in the industry. More
competition then would result in a lower level of future rents. We will come back to this later.
5 For the moment we focus on a zero correlation structure (for ease of exposition of the general ideas).
At a later stage the model specification will be generalized, since the size of the co-insurance effect will be
shown to depend on p.
6 This assumption implies that default in one division is not dissipative for the firm at large and favors
conglomeration. We will relax this assumption later on. See also footnote 5.
6flows are realized and repayments are made. Then the game ends.
A.3. Determination of Interest Rates and Market Discipline
In the absence of (some form of) market discipline the manager of division A makes his
risk choice after the contract terms have been set. Since financial market participants have rational
expectations the division A manager’s incentive to underinvest in effort to control risk will be
anticipated and incorporated in the contract terms. Because capital markets are assumed to be
competitive the funding costs RA, RB and R0 (expressed as interest factors) are set to yield the
lenders zero profits and satisfy
(1)
(2)
This reflects the co-insurance, and creates the diversification effect.
Effective market discipline limits division A’s ability to manipulate m; i.e. in the presence
of market discipline division A cannot costlessly reduce monitoring to increase risk. Market
discipline is incorporated in the model by assuming that RAand R0 partially reflect the actual
monitoring choice directly. This is possible because the division’s risk choice is partially
observable and verifiable’. The degree of market discipline imposed is denoted by a parameter
market discipline. In the presence of market discipline the choice of m has a direct effect on R.
introducing a direct effect of the choice of m on the division’s funding costs in the first order
condition. Let
7 Note that for reasons of interpretation here a possible link could be provided between the type (and
represents the degree of contractibility/verifiability of effort levels chosen in the division (interpretation
market discipline in terms of ‘transparency’). This will be elaborated upon in future versions of the paper.
7the degree of market discipline.
B. Analysis
Since the success probability of the project of division B is
actions, the analysis will proceed from the perspective of division
manager’s choice of monitoring intensity,
B.1 Risk Choice in a Stand-Alone Firm
independent of its manager’s
A. We start with division A
In the presence of market discipline the manager of a stand-alone division A solves the
following optimization problem:
(4)
With complete selffinancing the first best level of monitoring intensity m* chosen by the
monitoring chosen follows from the first order condition of (4), taking into account (A-1),
(5)
The following results can now be derived.
level of market discipline imposed and reaches the first best risk choice ( =monitoring
with the
intensity
8The intuition is as follows. Lemma 1 shows the discrepancy between the first best and the
actual level of monitoring chosen. In absence of market discipline the financial market can only
discipline mitigates moral hazard by creating a mechanism for ex post settling up, i.e. by directly
confronting the divisional manager with an increase in interest rate following his (lower)
monitoring decision. This will make the manager more reluctant to deviate from the optimal effort
decision and first best obtains.
B.2 Risk Choice in a Conglomerate
If division A and division B are integrated in a two-divisional firm, the manager of
division A determines his monitoring choice by solving the following optimization problem:
Note that the future rents F are available to division A even if division A fails, as long as division
order condition for division A can be expressed as follows:
(7)
Note that we have rearranged the terms in (7) to disentangle the various effects that differentiate
the conglomerate from the stand-alone case. We first derive the following result.
8 We will verify later under what conditions this conjecture is correct. Note that from equation (3) it is
from co-insurance. Note however that division A may choose different effort levels in a conglomerate firm
conglomerate firm is still sufficiently high (although it may be lower than in a stand-alone firm). If
diversification. This will be discussed in more detail below (see also the proof of Proposition 2).
9Lemma 3: Since  the impact of market discipline on division A is
lower in a two-divisional firm than in a stand-alone firm.
The intuition is that since in a multi-divisional firm the consequences of division A’s
moral hazard are shared by both divisions, division A is only partially confronted with its
discipline will be less effective in a conglomerate, even if outsiders can detect monitoring choices
of each division as easily in the conglomerate as in the stand-alone case.
We can now interpret equation (7). Comparing (5) to (7) identifies the three effects that
distinguish the two-divisional firm from the stand-alone division. The first two terms on the LHS
of equation (7) refer to the marginal return to effort of division A as a stand-alone firm (as can be
found in (5) as well). Conglomeration introduces three different effects:
First, a diversification effect of co-insurance, represented in the third term on the LHS of
two-divisional firm, and positively affects division A’s choice of monitoring;
Second, an incentive effect of co-insurance, represented in the fourth term on the LHS of
(7). This co-insurance effect guarantees that division A may capture its future rents F even
if it fails. This occurs whenever division B is successful. Division A therefore can free-
ride on division B in a two-divisional firm. This effect makes more risk (less monitoring)
acceptable to division A;
Third, an incentive effect due to a reduction in the impact of external market discipline,
represented in the fifth term on the LHS of equation (7). This induces additional free-
riding and adds to the negative incentive effect from co-insurance; this adversely affects
division A’s choice of monitoring.
The leads to the following two results.
intensity chosen by division A is higher ( = lower risk) in an integrated (conglomerate) firm than in
10The choice of monitoring made by division A results from a trade-off between a positive
diversification effect and negative incentive effects. If the level of capitalized future profits is high
(F large) the negative incentive effects are dominant and division A’s monitoring intensity is
reduced relative to the stand-alone case. For smaller values of F the diversification effect is
dominant, resulting in lower risk (higher monitoring intensity). Thus for low F,
conglomeration/integration is optimal. The intuition is as follows. The value of F is of primary
importance for the incentive effect of co-insurance. With a small F this effect is less important and
therefore imposes a smaller cost on conglomeration.
attractive. The reverse is true for high values of F.
a stand-alone division
preferred to conglomeration.
The intuition is straightforward.
attains first best risk choices and is therefore always
(Near) perfect market discipline does not leave much
value to conglomeration. That is, in the extreme -with perfect market discipline- incentives are
fully aligned and conglomeration could only make matters worse. At the other extreme, with no
market discipline, the prospects for conglomeration are best, resulting in a large interval of values
of F for which conglomeration is optimal.
B.3 Choice of Organizational Structure
Division A chooses an organizational structure that maximizes its expected payoff. This
decision is made prior to the monitoring decision at t =0. The following result can be derived.
The intuition is as follows. Note first that a stand-alone division A would benefit from
committing to a higher monitoring intensity (see Lemma 1). However, since the monitoring choice
a different organizational structure (conglomeration) may improve the privately optimal
monitoring choice. This is the case if division A can benefit from the diversification effects of co-
11insurance in a conglomerate. We have seen that for relatively low values of capitalized future
profits F division A will increase its monitoring intensity in a conglomerate (see Proposition 1).
co-insurance dominates and division A chooses a lower monitoring intensity if incorporated in a
conglomerate (Proposition 1). Conglomeration then still may be optimal since the net gain from
diversification (co-insurance) may exceed the net loss due to distorted incentives to control its
division A then will be distorted so much that the co-insurance effect will be completely
eliminated. No increase in F can make conglomeration desirable anymore, since the probability of
capturing these higher rents has deteriorated sufficient y. As we now show an internal allocation
of cost of capital could enlarge the set of circumstances where conglomeration is optimal.
IV. INTERNAL ALLOCATION OF COST OF CAPITAL
From Section III it is clear that integrating separate divisions in a conglomerate firm is
socially efficient if this results in better risk choices in the divisions. If this is not the case free-
riding (implying high risk) may dominate and division A may prefer to operate as a stand-alone
entity, and/or social efficiency might dictate the stand-alone option. Potentially valuable
diversification benefits then remain unexploited. One reason why division A may choose higher
risk (lower monitoring intensity) is because of the reduction in market discipline following
conglomeration. An increase in the impact of market discipline in a conglomerate firm therefore
could reduce free-riding and facilitate socially desirable integration.
In this section we show that an internal cost of capital allocation mechanism could create
internal discipline that complements (external) market discipline. Such a well-functioning (internal)
cost of capital allocation mechanism could align incentives and allow division A to optimally
benefit from the diversification benefit of integration.
The sequence of events now will be as follows. At t =0 the organizational structure of the
firm is determined, the firm is funded and in case of a two-divisional firm the CEO allocates (cost
of) capital to the respective divisions. The manager of division A chooses its risk level and both
divisions make their investment decisions. At t= 1 cash flows are realized and repayments are
division A’s choice of monitoring can be increased by an internal allocation of (the cost of) capital
to the respective divisions by a CEO, who is either potentially better informed with respect to the
incentive problems in division A than outsiders or could just undo the diluted market discipline in
12a conglomerate
9.
was charged to each division; this is now going to change. The internal allocation of cost of
capital is introduced in the following way. The CEO first allocates a differential charge to the
respective divisions to reflect intrinsic differences in riskiness, i.e. the CEO does not charge a
pooled rate to both divisions but differentiates the cost of capital charged between division A and
division B. This is analogous to charging the cost of capital which would be charged by the
market if division A and division B would be operated and funded as separate entities.
Simultaneously, the CEO could restore market discipline by increasing the sensitivity parameter in
the cost of capital charged to division A with respect to m. That is, he internally ‘leverages’ the
Note that the differential charge that is now imposed removes the diversification benefit
9 It is not necessary that the CEO is better informed than outsiders. If he were equally informed, and
could only undo the diluted impact of market discipline on division A by using an internal cost of capital
allocation, things would improve as well. In this case the total degree of (market) discipline that division A
than outsiders the total (market) discipline could become even larger,
sensitivity vis-a-vis the funding cost of the division as stand-alone entity.
13from the (nominal) funding costs. Each division will now be charged for its default risk. This
implies that both divisions will face a higher (nominal) funding cost than before. The following
result can be derived.
Lemma 4: A differential charge reflecting intrinsic differences in riskiness will elevate the
(nominal) funding cost faced by both divisions. This will worsen division A’s incentives.
The intuition for this lemma is that passively increasing capital charges worsens incentives.
It highlights the adverse outcomes that occur with classic moral hazard. An internal cost of capital
Proposition 3:
conglomerate, enlarging the range of values of F for which conglomeration is optimal; that is (see
The result in Proposition 3 shows the potential effectiveness of internal discipline.
Effectiveness requires a dynamic mechanism that responds
This discipline adds to the optimality of conglomeration, and
costs of the conglomerate bank.
continuously to actual risk choices.
will subsequently reduce the funding
attains; division A chooses its first best risk level.
A can be reduced by a well functioning internal cost of capital allocation mechanism and thus
promote socially desirable conglomeration.
V. PROPRIETARY TRADING: THE BARINGS CASE
A. Introduction
In this section we adapt our analysis to the specific features of the Barings debâcle as
14briefly discussed in the Introduction. In this extension we address the issue of the optimal
organizational structure of proprietary trading activities in banking and how it may undermine
other activities.
We will argue that the proprietary trading activity free-rides on the bank at large. This,
we will show, has three consequences; (i) proprietary trading appears more profitable than it
really is; (ii) a proprietary trading unit does not sufficiently internalize risks; and (iii) other
(mainly relationship-oriented) activities of banks may face an unfairly high cost of funds. The
implication might be that bankers mistakenly believe that proprietary trading is profitable, while
simultaneously undermining their relationship-oriented activities.
Note that much of the banking activities are relationship-oriented. Proprietary trading
activities however are different and involve arbitrage between different markets and/or different
financial products. These trading activities involve substantial risk, thus establishing the fair risk-
adjusted cost of funds is important. This cost might, given the specific nature of the trading
activities, differ substantially from the cost of funds of the bank as a whole. Moreover,
relationship-oriented banking by definition has a longer-term scope; the bank may need to heavily
invest in relationships at the outset (a ‘set-up’ cost), in order to benefit in the longer term. An
interaction therefore can be expected between relationship-specific effort exerted now and the
possibility to benefit from this in a later period. The activities in the trading division are more
short-term oriented and do not depend on relationship-specific effort. In a multi-divisional bank
however the risk choices of the trading division may have an impact on the relationship-banking
division, by affecting the risk -and survival probability- of the bank as a whole.
In our stylized framework, we thus envision two effects of proprietary trading on the
relationship banking activities: proprietary trading may impact the overall funding costs  and the
survival probability. Compared to our model setup so far we now activate division B as
proprietary trading division, and we interpret division A as the relationship-banking division. Our
primary  focus is on how the choices of division B may worsen the operations of, and choices
made by division A.
B. Specification and Analysis
As before, division A (the relationship-banking activity) chooses monitoring intensity m
some of the future benefits of relationship-specific investments and generalizes the exogenous
value of F as used before.
Our primary focus is on division B (the proprietary trading activity). This division
15Analogous to the main analysis in Section III two different organizational structures can be
distinguished; either stand-alone or conglomerate. The funding costs are as specified in (1)
choices if it operates stand alone and in a conglomerate respectively. We can now derive the
following result.
The proposition shows that effective market discipline (of stand-alone activities) discoura-
ges conglomeration. Conglomeration undermines market discipline and induces free-riding. On the
the beneficial effects of diversification dominate, and conglomeration becomes optimal.
Proposition 4 is in the spirit of our earlier results.
But even if it is optimal for division B to be part of a conglomerate with the relationship-
banking division A, is it optimal for division A? We can show:
Proposition 5 (Active Trading Division B):  The relationship banking division A may benefit
from conglomeration but the monitoring intensity is strictly less than with a passive division B
(see Proposition 1). Moreover, the potential benefits of conglomeration are strictly decreasing for
are possible cases where both division A and division B choose lower risk in a conglomerate than as stand-
alone entities. In this case conglomeration is socially desirable. Furthermore it is possible that division A
chooses a higher monitoring intensity while division B chooses higher risk in case of conglomeration. In this
16This proposition generalizes Proposition 1. Division A is now confronted with potentially
adverse incentives in the proprietary trading division B. This strictly reduces the benefits of
conglomeration. The second part of the proposition shows that the effect of m on the future profits
F further reduces the benefits of conglomeration. These results show how relationship-specific
activities may suffer from the proprietary trading activity, and further motivate the necessity of an
internal allocation of cost of capital.
Note that in the assumptions underlying Proposition 4 and 5 we may have underestimated
the consequences of risk taking in the proprietary trading division B. We assumed that division A
defaults less often as part of a conglomerate bank than as a stand-alone entity. We next allow the
proprietary trading division B to increase the default probability of the bank as a whole.
success probability of the relationship lending division A. We assume that default in the
proprietary trading division reduces the success probability of the relationship lending division
the respective divisions’ risk choices in a conglomerate bank.
Corollary 3: (preliminary)
The incentives for (excessive) risk taking in both divisions of the conglomerate bank increase with
case the total value of the conglomerate may be less than the sum of the values of the stand-alone divisions.
For a summary of all the possible combinations of risk choices and choices of organizational structure see
the proof of Proposition 5.
12 Note that here we focus on a one-sided impact of division B’s risk taking incentives on the success
probability of division A. This is done for reasons of (economic) interpretation and simplicity. Introducing a
two-sided impact (’correlation’) would not qualitatively change our results. Note furthermore that there may
be different ways to model the impact of excessive risk taking by proprietary trading on the relationship
banking division, e.g. by decreasing the capitalized value of future rents F(m) with some factor. The
difference between this option and our choice lies in the extent to which the relationship lending department
will be able to capture the current cash flow X. Our approach therefore is a bit more strict, since default in
the proprietary division will lower both the probability that the relationship lending division will incur X and
the expected capitalized value of future profits. Still another way of incorporating a dilution factor would be
17The intuition of Corollary 3 is that the possible dissipative impact of default in division B
proprietary trading department then undermines relationship banking activities (i.e. reduces
monitoring intensity in division A) even more and further reduces the benefits of conglomeration
to division A
13,
Proposition 4 and 5 and Corollary 3 together give us some key implications of the Barings
debâcle. Proprietary trading within a conglomerate bank may suffer from a lack of market
discipline, and as a result, excessive risk taking may occur that undermines the relationship-
specific activities. The latter effect is the key insight that this section adds to our general analysis
in Section III.
VI. APPLICATION: COST OF CAPITAL IN BANKING
An important issue is the cost of capital in banking. It seems a fact of life that banks
consider capital very expensive, and therefore want to use their capital as efficiently as possible.
In practice, bankers will tell you that capital costs say 15%, while debt (deposits) will not even
cost half of that. In their minds capital has this fixed high price. It is therefore not surprising that
they will choose to utilize this expensive capital as efficiently as possible. The problem with this
line of reasoning is that capital does not have one price; the cost of capital is determined by the
risks this capital is exposed to.
This puzzle may have a straightforward resolution. The bankers’ beliefs in expensive and
fixed price equity may create a self-fulfilling prophecy. The market knows that banks will put to
use any unit of idle capital (not using it, given the high fixed price is a waste!), and therefore the
market anticipates that any capital granted to a bank will be exposed to substantial risks. As a
matter of fact, matters might even be worse. Banks will seek to put to use idle capital rapidly
which elevates risk even more. These beliefs and anticipations create a perverse equilibrium.
Given the bankers state of mind -fixed priced, expensive capital that needs to be put to use as
quickly as possible- the market responds rationally by charging a higher price for capital. And
given these anticipations by the market, the bankers’ beliefs are justified and confirmed in
equilibrium.
Our analysis has something to say about this important issue. The belief in a fixed price
for capital ignores the potential corrections imposed by market discipline. In particular, we have
13 This is caused by the fact that the stronger negative incentive effects in case of conglomeration can
no longer be compensated for by the declining benefits of diversification.
18emphasized that effective market discipline is present if the cost of funds responds to actual risk
choices. The perverse equilibrium that is rooted in self-fulfilling beliefs is particularly relevant for
opaque (conglomerate) banking institutions. The market can then not sufficiently observe actual
risk choices and therefore acts on what it anticipates the banks might do. In more transparent
institutions, funding costs are better linked to  actual  risk choices, and less dependent on the
potentially ‘demoralizing’ indirect inferences (via the self-fulfilling beliefs of bankers and market).
Now banks could be more readily rewarded for good behavior. In other words, market discipline
might then work. This could ‘break’ the perverse equilibrium.
In the preceeding/previous sections we have analyzed the trade-off between
conglomeration and the more transparent stand-alone option. We have shown that conglomeration
would sometimes lower the overall cost of funding despite dilution in market discipline. The
reasoning in this section shows that self-fulfilling (perverse) beliefs may aggregate the
consequences of diluted market discipline. This may further elevate the importance of internal cost
of capital allocation mechanisms.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have focused on the incentives for risk taking in a multi-divisional (’conglomerate’)
bank. Incentive problems sometimes dictate integration of activities, but with perfect market
discipline always favor stand-alone activities. Conglomeration might have benefits that ‘replace’
ineffective market discipline. In particular, the augmented diversification may effectively relax the
limited liability constraint such that adverse incentives are mitigated. Typically however, we show
that conglomeration will undermine market discipline and invite free-riding. An effective internal
capital cost allocation mechanism might then be indispensable to mitigate these effects.
Two developments might be of direct importance for our analysis. First, in the recent
decennia we have observed substantial advances in information technology and an ever increasing
sophistication of financial markets. These developments suggest that market discipline has
improved over time. Together with our finding that more market discipline pushes us in the
direction of stand-alone activities, conglomeration should suffer. Second, the environment (for
banks and other firms) has generally become more competitive. Our findings suggest that this (a
lower F in our analysis) may actually favor conglomeration. These developments therefore do not
unambiguously point at conglomeration or separation of activities. However, we do show that
ultimately market discipline is a decisive factor (favoring separation).
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21APPENDIX
Note first that in the presence of market discipline the direct effect of m on the interest factor
the stand alone and conglomerate case respectively. Similarly, with an activated division B




. The second term on the
V(m) it can easily be seen
Furthermore, since it can be seen that
the optimal risk choice equals m
*. q
22it operates as a stand-alone firm and as part of a conglomerate firm respectively. Then for the
stand-alone case equation (5) and the second order condition can be written as
(A.3)
and the second order condition are given by
the LHS of the equations (A. 3) and (7) and satisfies
(A.5)
23Proof of Corollary 1:  The first part of Corollary 1 follows readily from Lemma 2. For the
and (3) and from using (A- 1) it can be derived that
With conglomeration therefore the
completes the proof. Alternatively, it intensity m* will not be attained. That
first best monitoring
can be shown that the
Proposition 1 then it
q
organizational structure is defined to be socially efficient if it maximizes the total surplus
generated by their respective investments .
divisions the total surplus
the benefit from co-insurance (through F) exceeds the loss due to distorted incentives. Define F
0
as the level of capitalized future profits for which this condition holds with equality. Then it can
completes the proof. q
14 In this analysis we ignore the potential divergence private and social optimality rootes in the private
costs V(m). More specifically, we suppress the effect of V(m) in the choice of organizational structure. In
future versions of the paper, this effect will be analyzed in some detail.
24Proof of Proposition 3: In the presence of internal discipline the first order condition of division




given in Proposition 1) as the cutoff level of
the absence of internal discipline, it can
F corresponding with
easily be seen that
that the presence of
allocation mechanism based on both a differential charge and internal discipline is preferred over
q
25Proof of Corollary
subjected to equals 1
Proof of Proposition
The result then follows readily from Lemma 2. q
4: Division B’s optimization problem is the following
and the second order condition
condition of division B’s optimization
(A.12)
B’s risk choice in case of conglomeration. The first order
problem in case of conglomeration is given by (A. 13)
(A.13)
condition corresponding to (A. 13) then dictates that
B chooses the organizational structure which maximizes its expected payoff. Division B’s expected
payoff if it operates as a stand-alone division is given by (A. 14)
(A. 14)
26(A.16)
Proof of Proposition 5: The first order condition of division A’s optimization problem if it
operates as a stand-alone firm is given by
In case of conglomeration the first order condition of division A’s optimization problem is
27summarizes the possible combinations of risk choices and choice of organizational structure. To be
completed. q




































































































Overview of Possible Combinations of Risk Choice and Choice of Organizational Structure
HHC LHC LHS LLS LLS
I
HHC LHC LLC LLS LLS
II
HHC LHC LLC LLS LLS
III
HHC HLC LLC LLS LLS
IV
HHC HLC LLC LLS LLS
V
HHC HLC HLS LLS LLS
VI
A chooses lower risk in case of conglomeration and L otherwise; the second capital B
equals H if B chooses lower risk in case of conglomeration and L otherwise; the third
capital O is equal to C if the resulting organizational structure is conglomeration and S
otherwise.
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